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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups 
has created unprecedented challenges in Central America.  
Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries 
spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to 
the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces 
are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the 
criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. 
 
With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine 
trafficked from South America to the United States passing 
through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers 
through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply 
withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous.   
 
These conditions raise the question:  to what extent are 
militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to 
criminal groups?  The study focuses on three cases:  
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras.  It finds that: 
 Although illicit ties between the military and criminal 
groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these 
countries are not yet “lost” to criminal groups. 
 Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military 
stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. 
 In general the less exposed services, the navies and air 
forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their 
roles in interdiction. 
 Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military 
is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context 
where civilian corruption is extremely common, state 
institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system 
remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and 
political will needed to make necessary reforms. 
 Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain 
less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the 
police.  
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However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, 
there is a limited window of opportunity in which to 
introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such 
efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in 
other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement 
and the justice system, are also addressed. 
 
Measures targeted toward the military should include: 
 Enhanced material benefits and professional education 
opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising 
legitimate careers once they leave military service. 
 A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically 
designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. 
 More effective securing of military arsenals. 
 Skills and external oversight leveraged through 
combined operations, to build cooperation among those 
sectors of the military that have successful and clean 
records in countering criminal groups, and to expose 
weaker forces to effective best practices.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Daily news reports capture the growing scale of violence in 
Central America.  Homicide rates in the region have 
skyrocketed in the Northern Triangle countries of El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, with the most dramatic 
increase, in Honduras, literally doubling the country‟s 
murder rate over the last five years from 43 to 86 per 
100,000 inhabitants – now the highest in the hemisphere.1  
The economic costs of crime in the region are also 
astounding, ranging between 8 and 11 percent of GDT in 
terms of expenditures on law enforcement, private security, 
and healthcare.
2
  Behind these trends are established criminal 
gangs and the growing competition among organized crime 
groups, particularly as Mexico-based cartels have shifted 
their operational control further “upstream” into Central 
America to capture greater profits and take advantage of 
significant weaknesses to a greater or lesser extent 
throughout the region:  weak state institutions, corrupt public 
officials, and national territories where security forces are 
undermanned and insufficiently monitored are central factors 
contributing to the growth of organized crime in the region.  
As a result, according to U.S. government estimates, by 2011 
some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked 
from South America to the United States was passing 
through Central America – up from 42 percent  in 2008 and 
60 percent in 2010.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Estimate for 2011 by the National Commission for Human Rights 
(CONADEH) in Honduras, compared with the figure for 2006.  By 
comparison, in the United States the homicide rate is about 5 per 
100,000.  
2
 The World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A 
Development Challenge (Washington, DC:  World Bank Group, 2011), 
p. 7. 
3
 The White House, Presidential Determination No. 2011-16 on Major 
Illicit Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal 
Year 2012, September 15, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 
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With Central American governments increasingly unable to 
provide a reassuring degree of public security for their 
citizens or to effectively stem the overwhelming flow of 
drugs through the region, they have brought the armed forces 
into the fight.  Currently, every military in Central America 
is involved in counterdrug operations to some extent, 
whether as backup for police units or through interdiction of 
air- and sea-trafficked contraband.  Military forces clearly 
bring added capabilities that police forces lack.
4
  Still, it is 
not clear that bringing the military into on-the-ground 
operations against criminal groups is worth the risk of 
exposing them more directly to potential cooptation by 
criminal groups – unless the use of military force is carefully 
calibrated to the task and combined with a range of well-
coordinated, long-term security sector and judicial reforms. 
 
In most cases, when the military is brought in, it has to come 
up from behind.  For instance, in Guatemala, the region‟s 
long-time epicenter of criminal groups trafficking children, 
migrants, cars and arms as well as drugs, the total value of 
goods seized by authorities in 2009 equaled 5.4 percent of 
GDP, compared with State spending on security at only 1.2 
percent of GDP.
5
  What is more, break-out groups like the 
                                                                                                    
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy (INCSR), 2010 and 2011 reports, indexed at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. 
4
 For instance, as numerous civilian security experts and some military 
officers interview for this project noted, compared with police forces the 
military typically not only has greater firepower, but also a round-the-
clock mission orientation and a tied-to-the-barracks location, whereas 
police forces typically quit when their shift is over and go home to 
civilian lives that are often in the same communities where criminal 
groups operate.  
5
 Julie López, “Guatemala‟s Crossroads:  The Democratization of 
Violence and Second Chances,” in Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson, 
eds., Organized Crime in Central America:  The Northern Triangle 
(Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011), p. 186.  This article 
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Zetas have been able to stay one step ahead of conventional 
military forces by recruiting members from Mexican and 
Guatemalan army Special Forces to their ranks. 
 
Illicit ties, which involve active duty members of the military 
in active or passive collusion with criminal groups, are 
developing more frequently.  There have been numerous 
high-profile instances of arms mysteriously disappearing or 
being stolen from military stockpiles in El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras, only to turn up later in the hands 
of criminal groups.  As a result, virtually every grenade 
attack by the Salvadoran Mara gangs has involved U.S.-
issued M-67 grenades, and U.S.-issued anti-tank weapons 
that disappeared from Honduran stockpiles were later found 
in an arms cache in drug violence torn Juarez, Mexico.  In 
2010, in a spectacular theft from a Honduran military hangar, 
an airplane confiscated in a counterdrug operation was flown 
away before military forces reached the scene.   
 
Cases like these raise the crucial question:  to what extent are 
militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to 
criminal groups?  This question drives the research laid out 
in this paper, which draws on reports by government 
agencies, the news media, and non-governmental 
organizations; and over 30 in-country personal interviews 
with government officials, academics and policy experts, and 
members of the armed forces conducted in July and August 
of 2011.   
 
A central conclusion from the study is that militaries in the 
region are not yet “lost” to criminal groups.  Certainly, illicit 
ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in 
the last decade as new criminal groups have gained presence 
in the region, seeking arms, new recruits and transport 
                                                                                                    
provides an extraordinarily detailed and up-to-date accounts of 
Guatemalan crime groups and should be required reading. 
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routes.  Yet despite this growth, in most of the region the 
armed forces are not more frequently embroiled in illicit 
activities than their civilian peers, for instance in the police 
and judicial system, or in local politics and the business 
sector.  Rather, support from military collaborators is one 
link in a wider system of associates that criminal groups 
need to rely on to maintain trafficking structures throughout 
the region.   
 
The window of opportunity that currently remains open 
needs to be used as quickly as possible in the worsening 
crime-and-insecurity context.  Efforts need to take the entire 
system of links into account.  For the military in particular, 
leverage mechanisms should focus on a strategic system of 
rewards and punishments to deter collusion with criminal 
groups – rewarding clean military units, creating new 
carefully vetted ones, and in extreme cases dissolving (and 
prosecuting members of) units with a record of criminal ties.  
International cooperation, including strong support from the 
United States, is essential, particularly in promoting 
cooperation among those sectors of the military – the 
region’s navies and air forces in particular – that have 
generally remained “clean.”  
 
The remainder of the paper focuses on laying out the most 
significant patterns and recent developments that affect the 
propensity of militaries in Central America to become (or 
remain) engaged in illicit activities.  The next three sections 
discuss in turn Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. The 
final section offers suggestions for policy initiatives that can 
help to reduce opportunities for illicit relationships to 
prosper in the armed forces.  As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, 
there are important variations in the levels of violence, 
effectiveness of drug interdiction, and public perception of 
security forces and policies.  In particular, Nicaragua‟s 
indicators present an interesting contrast to the cases of the 
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Northern Triangle and suggest that probing that case may be 
particularly useful in identifying policy strategies.  
 
Table 1.  Key Indicators by Country 
Country Population 
(2010)
6
 
GNI/capita 
(2009)
7
 
Homicides 
per 
100,000 
(2010)
8
 
Cocaine 
Interdiction 
(2010)
9
 
El 
Salvador 
6.2 million US$ 3,370 64.4 126 kg 
Guatemala 14.3 
million 
US$ 2,620 41 7.1 metric 
tons (2009) 
Honduras 7.6 million US$ 1,820 77 (2009) 6.1 metric 
tons 
Nicaragua 5.8 million US$ 1,000 14 (2006) 17.5 metric 
tons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Source: United Nations. 
7
 Source:  World Bank. 
8
 Source:  U.S. State Department, except Nicaragua data from World 
Bank. 
9
 Source:  U.S. State Department, 2011 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, country sections. 
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Table 2. Public Opinion on Security Institutions and 
Policies 
 
Country Do You 
Trust the 
Military? 
(2008)10 
Do You 
Trust 
the 
Police? 
(2010)11 
Approval 
of the 
Gov’t 
(2010) 12 
Approve 
Gov’t 
Security 
Policies 
(2010)13 
Country is 
Progressing 
(2010)14 
El 
Salvador 
56.5 % 49.3 % 71 % 48 % 24 % 
Guatemala 52.9 % 31.0 % 47 % 22 % 14 % 
Honduras 51.9 % 54.1 % 51 % 33 % 10 % 
Nicaragua 61.5 % 54.7 % 58 % 58 % 39 % 
 
Nicaragua:  Professionalism at Risk 
 
On many levels, Nicaragua‟s military is an outlier in the 
region:  unreformed from its Sandinista roots, but 
remarkably professional and apolitical, with institutional 
economic interests through its legal but entirely opaque 
social security fund, it consistently ranks as the most trusted 
public institution in the country.
15
  This is particularly 
remarkable as civilians have rarely exercised effective 
oversight over the military or set clear defense policy, 
leaving the institution essentially autonomous from civilian 
                                                 
10
 Percent responding in affirmative. Source:  Latin American Public 
Opinion Project, “Do you Trust your Armed Forces?” 
AmericasBarometer Insights #27 (2009). 
11
 Percent responding in affirmative. Source: Latin American Public 
Opinion Project, “Trust in the National Police,” AmericasBarometer 
Insights # 59 (2011). 
12
 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe Latinobarómetro 2010 
(Santiago, Chile: 2010),  p. 79. 
13
 Informe Latinobarómetro 2010, p. 79. 
14
Ibid. p. 18. 
15 Elites rank the military even more highly than average citizens, with a 
difference of about 7 percentage points.  See Margarita Corral, “The 
State of Democracy in Latin America:  A Comparative Analysis of the 
Attitudes of Elites and Citizens,” Boletín PNUD and Instituto de 
Iberoamérica #1, January 2011. 
9 
 
control.
16
  Taken together, these qualities have a significant 
restraining influence on propensities to engage with criminal 
groups. 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
16
 See the account of historian Roberto Cajina, the dean of Nicaraguan 
civil-military relations studies, in “Reconversión de la Defensa in 
Nicaragua: Asimetrías e incoherencias,” Security and Defense Studies 
Review 2 (Summer 2002), 81-101; and the conforming analysis by 
former defense ministry adviser Carlos Arroyo Borgen, “De la guerrilla a 
la consolidación institucional:  la singular evolución del Ejército de 
Nicaragua,” Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y 
Caribe, 2010 (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2010), pp. 252-253. 
10 
 
Military Entrepreneurship 
As was true in all of the post-war transitions in Central 
America, the Sandinista Popular Army sought to survive and 
maintain institutional autonomy and secure resources as it 
headed into the democratic, peacetime, and post-Cold War 
environment.  Confronted with the loss of foreign patronage, 
an economy in shambles, and the opposition‟s win in the 
1990 elections that the Sandinistas themselves had allowed, 
army leaders anticipated the massive demobilization that 
would bring forces that had once numbered over 130,000 
(including reserves and conscripts) down to a professional 
force of about 15,000.   
 
While the most senior commanders of the Sandinista army 
got rich through the famed piñata that allowed them to take 
the best holdings in the “distribution” of state assets,17  there 
was not enough money to compensate other officers and 
troops.  With a need estimated at over US$ 18 million and 
the military‟s new social security institute (Instituto de 
Previsión Militar, IPSM) not yet funded, the army received 
grants from European governments for about US$ 6.5 
million that allowed thousands of officers to take a hybrid 
three month course in business administration at the 
prestigious INCAE graduate business school of Central 
America.
18
  Officers also received US$1,000 as start-up 
                                                 
17
 These were state assets – typically expropriated land and business 
properties of the former regime‟s ousted Somoza clan and its allies, 
compensated to them by the state but now taken by top FSLN leaders as 
war booty.  On the transition, see Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy and 
Michael Dodson, “Political Bargaining and Democratic Transitions: A 
Comparison of Nicaragua and El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies 31:1 (February 1999), pp. 99-127. 
18
 Created in 1963 as an initiative of the Kennedy Administration with 
joint sponsorship by USAID and the Harvard Business School, INCAE is 
Central America‟s premier business and public administration school, 
with campuses in several countries including Nicaragua.  During the 
Revolution, the business administration program was suspended, but the 
functional administration program continued and is likely what 
11 
 
capital from the government to found their own small 
business, though most used the cash to pay off debts and 
living expenses rather than to become overnight 
entrepreneurs.
19
  Even so, military‟s emphasis on second 
career education prevailed:  in order to advance to senior 
ranks, both military and police officers are required to take 
degrees in a civilian profession (law, public administration, 
accounting and business administration are common) and 
today even critics of the military‟s involvement in economic 
activities praise this innovation.
20
  It sets the Nicaraguan 
military apart from its neighbors by preparing officers for a 
second career in an occupation other than the private security 
sector, which elsewhere in the region is the most common 
sector to absorb former forces.  The professional preparation 
requirement arguably makes Nicaraguan officers less caste-
bound and more profession-oriented – and by extension less 
beholden to political cronyism. 
 
IPSM 
The military leadership‟s golden calf is the aforementioned 
IPSM – not because its pensions or other benefits are 
                                                                                                    
Sandinista officers studied.  While I could not determine whether military 
officers during the Somoza dictatorship studied at INCAE in earlier 
decades (it seems doubtful), there is an interesting parallel with Cuban 
military officers beginning to study (capitalist) business administration in 
European schools in the 1980s, at the initiative of the longtime head of 
the army, Raúl Castro who saw a need to enhance efficiency in state 
enterprises that were to be managed by the reliably loyal armed forces.  
For a brief overview of the Cuban case, see Kristina Mani, “Military 
Entrepreneurs:  Patterns in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and 
Society 53:3 (Fall 2011), pp. 25-55. 
19
 Author interview with retired General Hugo Torres Jiménez, a former 
director of the military intelligence agency and currently a leader in the 
opposition Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), Managua, July 8, 
2011. 
20
 Author interviews with Roberto Orozco and Yassir Chavirría, defense 
and security research associates at the Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos 
y Políticas Públicas (IEEPP), Managua, respectively July 6 and 8, 2011. 
12 
 
particularly generous, but because it enables business 
relationships with enterprises owned by retired military 
officers; active service officers may not be business owners, 
but retired officers are often shareholders in the IPSM-
invested firms or those with which they do business.  Prior to 
1990, no military welfare fund existed – unusual in the 
region, where militaries set up such funds in earlier decades 
(under Somoza, “provision” for the forces occurred through 
a personalist prebend system).  Perverse luck and state assets 
allowed the new social security project to be funded with 
seed money from the secret 1992 sale of military equipment 
to both Ecuador and Peru, which were embroiled in a rivalry 
and later engaged in a brief but costly war with each other.  
The sales brought about US$25 million in seed money for 
the IPSM equity fund.
21
    
 
IPSM‟s equity fund was valued in 2004 at US$30 million 
according to the little data IPSM makes public, and in 2007 
at US$65 million according to a confidential 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers audit.  Critics of the IPSM 
structure suspect the fund, which in 2007 was heavily 
exposed in U.S. stock markets, took a huge hit in the global 
recession.  Management of the fund follows informally 
presented directives from the military high command but 
remains entirely opaque, with no public auditing or 
legislative or public oversight.
22
  In steps not countenanced 
                                                 
21
 Entire squadrons of Mi-25 helicopters were sold to Peru, as well as 
artillery and other equipment (including for Ecuador radar able to detect 
the new Peruvian attack helicopters), with spare parts included.  The 
sales were justified later by former general and defense minister Joaquín 
Cuadra as imperative in the country‟s financial situation where 10,000 
officers were soon to retire without ready compensation.  Roberto 
Fonseca and Roberto Orozco, “7 años después, detalles inéditos de la 
venta de armas a Perú y Ecuador,” Suplemento Enfoque, La Prensa 
(Managua), October 27, 1999.   
22
 Author interviews with Roberto Orozco of IEEPP, July 6, 2011, and 
Carlos Arroyo Borgen, former Defense Ministry official, July 9, 2011; 
13 
 
under the law, it has taken short term “loans” from the public 
sector pension fund that were later paid back quickly when 
revealed in the press.  In several instances reported in the 
press, companies owned in part by IPSM have expropriated 
(or poorly compensated) owners of property the IPSM 
companies sought for real estate developments.   
 
IPSM‟s current practices matter with respect to illicit 
activities in at least two possible ways.  One is that it is very 
likely the opportunities for former military officers to 
network into existing business relationships created through 
the IPSM structure keep them quite busy in licit ventures, 
maintain the promise of such ties for those still in military 
service, and do not undermine the public image of 
professionalism the military has carefully cultivated.  The 
other factor is that the fund‟s likely losses are correlated with 
a significant expansion of former officers into public 
administration positions during the current government of 
Daniel Ortega, the longtime head of the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) elected to the presidency in 2006.  
The Ortega appointments are certainly due to bringing 
retired military Ortega loyalists into key state posts (for 
instance, Antenor Rosales as central bank president since 
2007; and close Ortega political broker Álvaro Baltodano the 
same year as director of the Free Trade Zone Commission
23
), 
                                                                                                    
Eduardo Marenco, “Empresarios en Uniforme: los negocios del Ejército 
de Nicaragua, 1995-2007,” IEEPP research paper, 2007.  The 
confidential PWC audit, a copy of which the author acquired from non-
military sources, was commissioned by the military for its perusal – it is 
summarized for the executive branch and not shared with.  
23
 Despite being an alliance broker for Ortega, U.S. Embassy officials 
consider him to be a “voice of reason…at least on economic issues.”  
U.S. Embassy Managua cable, “Nicaragua: US Ambassador Calls on 
Free Trade Commissioner,” December 11, 2008.  Published in La 
Nación, February 6, 2011. 
http://www.nacion.com/Generales/Subsitios/Investigacion/2011/WikiLea
ks/EntregaW/WIKILEAK177999.aspx 
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many of the less politically connected officers who cannot 
afford to retire into state posts.
24
   
 
Military Autonomy in the Ortega Period 
President Ortega has appointed a significant number of 
former Sandinista commanders to top posts
25
 and other 
former officers also at lower levels.  Several individuals 
interviewed for this project noted the military has “unwritten 
rules” that military officers should not take political 
appointments for at least a year even after retirement; Ortega 
has interfered with this principle. This raises the concern that 
the military‟s tradition of being both beyond civilian control 
and beyond civilian political cooptation may fall to 
politicization.   
 
Yet overall, the military hierarchy appears to be privileging 
its institutional autonomy and cohesion over political perks.  
Even the current president, Daniel Ortega, has had to bargain 
hard with the military – and accepted a deal that effectively 
eviscerated the defense ministry and made the military 
accountable only to the president.  In situations of 
emergency, the military intelligence agency can now extend 
its authority over civilian agencies (police, migration, border 
and customs authorities, etc.).  Critics rightfully see this as 
enabling the “militarization of public institutions.”26  Still, 
the Nicaraguan military is quite far away from the high 
                                                 
24
 Several individuals interviewed for this project suggested this. 
25
 For an extensive list and analysis of Ortega appointments that suggests 
the president took a “big tent” rather than ideological approach to 
defining them, see Francisco A. Guevara Jerez, “Who‟s Who in the New 
Cabinet,” Revista Envío, February 2007. 
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3460 
26
 This is the view of the country‟s main independent think tank on 
citizen and state security analysis, IEEPP.  For their critical assessment, 
see Ary Pantoja, “Ciudadanía bajo inteligencia militar,” El Nuevo Diario 
(Managua), December 1, 2010. 
http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/89365 
15 
 
degree of political allegiance that Venezuela‟s Hugo Chávez 
has required of the Bolivarian Armed Forces.
27
 
 
The Military’s Counterdrug Operations 
Nicaragua is still relatively “quiet” on the drug trafficking 
front, serving primarily as a refuge for traffickers when the 
heat gets too strong elsewhere, rather than as major transport 
hub like Honduras.  Yet it is clear that drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) are targeting the gamut of Nicaraguan 
officials, including government ministers, judges, 
prosecutors, legislators, police, and high ranking officers in 
the military, according to the files of a now-disbanded 
national police unit the United States was instrumental in 
building.  That unit was disbanded by Ortega, reportedly 
because it had gotten too close to acting on its evidence.
28
 
 
In contrast, the Nicaraguan Navy continues to work very 
closely with U.S. agencies in counterdrug work; in 2010 it 
confiscated over 75 percent of all cocaine seized by 
Nicaraguan authorities (indicated in Table 1), much of this in 
cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA).
29
  This is another indication that the military 
acts in its own interests and not at the behest of the political 
leadership.  Lacking significantly in equipment so that it is 
able to act on only about 25 percent of the information it 
                                                 
27
 Chávez is a significant benefactor for ALBANISA, the corporation set 
up to distribute Venezuelan aid at the discretion of Ortega with no 
legislative oversight as would normally be required of state spending.  In 
the dissident wing of the Sandinista (MRS) several prominent former 
Sandinista military officers are significant figures, often criticizing the 
discretionary funds in the millions of U.S. dollars contributed by 
Venezuela.  Author interview with General Hugo Torres Jiménez. 
28
 “Agentes de la Unidad corrían graves riesgos,” El Nuevo Diario 
(Managua), April 9, 2010. 
http://archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2010/04/09/nacionales/122130 
29
 As a U.S. DEA official interviewed for this project in El Salvador on 
July 12, 2011 noted, “Ortega gets it.” See also U.S. State Department‟s  
INCSR 2011, pp. 422-423. 
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receives from the DEA,
30
  the chief of Nicaragua‟s Atlantic 
Naval Command lamented in 2007 that trafficker opponents 
have superior equipment like night vision and satellite 
communications, which his forces lack.
31
 
 
In the interim, the navy has acknowledged its forces are now 
the target of criminal groups offering them money to look 
the other way, in one reported case for as much as US$ 
50,000, and there have been cases of “friendly relations” to 
DTOs within the navy‟s ranks that the leadership says it 
punished.
32
  Such open discussion of the challenges 
confronting the military is notably different than what 
officials in other countries have often commented to the 
press – for instance in Honduras, the defense minister has 
repeatedly denied that Mexican drug boss Joaquín “El 
Chapo” Guzmán operates there, despite numerous reliable 
accounts of his presence.  The issue is less about being 
truthful than a reflection of the handle the two countries have 
over their organized crime threats – in Nicaragua it may still 
be manageable and discussable, but this is not the case 
elsewhere in the region. 
 
EL SALVADOR’S MILITARY:  REFORMED BUT 
BATTERED 
 
Of the Northern Triangle countries, El Salvador‟s military 
and defense ministry officials show the most professionalism 
and have been the most committed to addressing the problem 
of military collusion with organized crime.  The 2009 
election of Mauricio Funes, of the former guerrilla 
                                                 
30
 Author interview with Chavirría, July 8, 2011. 
31
 Bernd Debusmann, “Cocaine is King on Nicaragua‟s Caribbean 
Coast,” Reuters. Jan 29, 2007. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/30/us-nicaragua-cocaine-
idUSN2326993620070130 
32
 “Intentos narcos de permear al Ejército,” El Nuevo Diario (Managua), 
July 18, 2011. http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/108092  
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Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), ended 
more than two decades of right-wing government under the 
(Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and moved the 
country away from a focus on the heavy handed “mano 
dura” security policies that frequently put the military back 
into policing roles yet failed to curtail gang-based violence.  
The U.S. government has acknowledged El Salvador‟s 
commitments to security sector reforms by positioning El 
Salvador to be Central America‟s leader in setting security 
policy models and anti-crime initiatives.  With these 
accomplishments in mind, however, the country is still far 
from defeating its non-state challengers. 
 
 
 
The Transition to Professional Forces 
El Salvador‟s internationally-brokered peace accords defined 
a clear and immediate reform agenda for the military in the 
post-war period.  Reforms, which were monitored in the 
initial transition period (1991-1995) by a United Nations 
18 
 
observer mission, included limiting the military‟s mission to 
national territorial defense; ending its missions in internal 
security and the maintenance of constitutional order; placing 
the military under the authority of a civilian-led defense 
ministry; reducing military forces by half (including a purge 
of forces) within the first year of the peace; and reorganizing 
forces and revising their training programs to build 
professionalism and respect for human rights.  In addition, 
there were important economic pacts in the peace:  agrarian 
lands and agricultural and educational credits were 
distributed to former combatants from both sides of the war; 
the accords also contained specific legal protections to 
facilitate the former guerrillas‟ reintegration into society. 33 
 
The Complex Challenge of Illegal Armed Groups 
Today the military numbers just over 14,000 forces, less than 
one-quarter of its size at the end of the war.  However, as 
early as the mid 1990s, the special Joint Group established 
by agreement between the new Salvadoran government and 
the United Nations determined that the death squads of the 
war period – now purged from formal state institutions – had 
reinvented themselves for the post-war period as criminal 
organizations engaged in extortion, killings for hire, and a 
host of drug, car and arms trafficking, and that they operated 
with support from state authorities in both the civilian and 
security sectors.
34
  So while El Salvador is typically hailed 
(and compared favorably with Guatemala)  for the degree to 
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 Margarita S. Studemeister, ed., El Salvador: Implementation of the 
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34
 The Joint Group report, Documento Especial: Informe del Grupo 
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motivación política en El Salvador, was published July 28, 1994 and is 
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ONUSAL's human rights division, the country‟s human rights 
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which the military, judiciary, and the police underwent 
reforms in the post-war period, it too has exhibited the 
presence of “sleeper cells” similar to those that have been 
described as persisting in Guatemala‟s “illegal groups and 
clandestine security apparatuses” (CIACS).35   
 
The existence of such groups in post-war El Salvador was 
never challenged at the time through state policies, implying 
that even with the best-structured start-up conditions follow-
through policies are imperative.  It also emphasizes that El 
Salvador‟s criminal groups are not “only” sourced from 
abroad (Mexican cartels, repatriated Maras), but also involve 
a significant home-grown component that will make 
dismantling it (and the linkages it has to transnational 
groups) very challenging without significant resources 
applied in a region-wide strategy.
36
  
 
Military Security Work and Issues of Exposure 
Under Funes, the military has again been called into internal 
security roles on an emergency basis.  It currently provides 
security at official border crossings, prison perimeters, and 
on the streets; it has also been called in to protect the 
country‟s valuable coffee sector, protecting transit to allow 
growers to get goods to market.   
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 The UN established a special commission to examine the activities of 
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and Olson, eds., Organized Crime in Central America, pp. 104-138. 
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With the Zetas and other groups seeking to acquire newer, 
high-caliber weapons, Salvadoran forces have become a 
particular target.  Unlike Guatemala‟s forces, where arms 
sales from the United States remain embargoed, Salvadoran 
forces were the beneficiaries of U.S. arms sales, particularly 
in the 1980s but also in later decades.  El Salvador acquired 
about 266,000 M67 grenades from United States between 
1980 and 1993; Salvadoran officials acknowledge that 
almost all of the grenade attacks carried out by the maras 
(for whom grenades are their extortion weapon of choice) 
have involved M67s.  In 2009 the government consolidated 
remaining stocks into high-security locations, and says no 
subsequent losses of grenades were reported.  But many 
arms are already “loose” and grenade attacks haven‟t 
significantly abated in either El Salvador or Mexico, where 
over 5800 live U.S.-issued grenades were confiscated 
between 2007-2010.
37
  Several recent cases of current and 
former Salvadoran soldiers trying to sell arms and military 
uniforms are under investigation or prosecution.
38
  
 
As a result, the military has worked hard to foster 
professional discipline and cares about its international 
image.  For instance, the military leadership knew that the 
revelation in 2011 of the Capitán case – in which a former 
Salvadoran army soldier seeking to sell weapons and 
explosives to Colombia‟s FARC insurgents was arrested in 
the United States in a DEA sting operation – would make it 
look bad, but cooperated fully in the investigation in order to 
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deter corruption in its ranks.
39
  In addition, the defense 
ministry has recently instituted new benefits in subsidized 
housing and healthcare coverage, particularly for forces 
serving on an emergency basis in public security and prison 
security.  The new benefits policies were triggered by the 
dismissal of 42 soldiers for involvement in selling arms from 
military stockpiles to criminal groups.
40
  Yet as a locally 
based DEA official worried, “the longer the military is in law 
enforcement, the more probable corruption within it 
becomes.”41 
 
HONDURAS:  POST-COUP GROUND ZERO 
 
As a staging ground for forces in neighboring civil wars in 
the 1980s, Honduras can lay claim to important stockpiles of 
arms that are a hold over from those wars.  Unlike its war-
afflicted neighbors, however, the military never experienced 
the pressures of post-war “demobilization” or military 
reform.  The military has a long history of involvement in 
the management of state-owned enterprises, many of which 
were created under authoritarian rule in the 1970s in the era 
when major state-sponsored development projects was in 
vogue.  That record translated in the 1980s, now under a 
democratic regime, into significant investments by the 
military‟s social security fund in major national enterprises, 
much like what developed in Nicaragua but on an even 
greater scale. 
 
Yet the most important recent development – the civilian-
military coup that ousted leftist President Manuel Zelaya in 
June 2009 and ushered in a seven-month period of de facto 
rule under Roberto Micheletti – has had lasting effects on the 
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country‟s exposure to transnational DTOs.  The coup made 
Honduras the political pariah in the region and brought on 
the loss of U.S. counter-drug and development assistance.  
Along with Micheletti‟s redeployment of the military away 
from counterdrug work to repression of political protestors 
and guarding of formal border crossings
42
 to prevent 
Zelaya‟s return, this opened the floodgates to drug 
trafficking that skyrocketed after the coup.
43
  As a result, 
Honduras is today not only the air and sea gateway
44
 for 
drugs entering Central America from South America, but  
arguably the weakest link the region in terms of countering 
the penetration of organized crime. 
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IPM 
Modeled on the Guatemalan military‟s social security fund, 
and itself later copied by the Nicaraguan military, the 
Honduran Instituto de Previsión Militar (IPM) has a 
remarkable rollercoaster-like history.  Democratization in 
1984 removed the military from its formal role in politics, 
but left it with other positions of power:  senior military 
officers in active service continued to staff government 
ministries and to direct strategic state industries and public 
utilities.  As state assets were privatized, the IPM gained 
privileged access to buy shares in public companies at 
insider prices.  In this way IPM assets grew dramatically in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as it acquired controlling 
interests in at least 17 major companies in sectors ranging 
24 
 
from agriculture and construction, to real estate development 
and banking.
45
 
 
However, many of these holdings were inefficient and poorly 
managed from the start, and military control via IPM appears 
only to have worsened conditions.  By the late 1990s, the 
fund‟s solvency was in question and under pressure from 
senior military officers IPM contracted an independent audit 
that to this day remains unpublicized.
46
  The audit led to the 
sell-off of numerous insolvent holdings.  Under new 
direction for more than a decade, IPM is now risk averse – it 
emphasizes “long-term holdings” and no longer invests 
holdings directly in overseas markets.
47
  Yet despite the 
crisis of the late 1990s that appears to be familiar lore in 
Honduran political and business circles, there is no public 
information about IPM‟s investment holdings.48  IPM – a 
formal, publicly funded institution that annually receives 
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over 20 percent of its capital from state and affiliate 
contributions – remains exempt from basic transparency.49   
   
The IPM saga is a telling reflection of the military‟s 
continued ability to maintain institutional privileges with 
little to no civilian oversight, and of the ruling political 
elite‟s disinterest in altering this arrangement.  Honduran 
civil-military relations basically reflect a mutual elite non-
intervention pact – one that was broken during the Zelaya 
government‟s repoliticization of the military, in which the 
president significantly increased defense spending, expanded 
the military‟s role in development and infrastructure 
building, and then concluded wrongly that the military would 
not resist being enlisted to oversee the controversial 
referendum that became the immediate reason for the 
president‟s overthrow.50  In this context, it is hardly 
surprising that military officials and their civilian defense 
ministry spokespersons
51
 frequently assert that the military is 
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clean – unlike its peers in Nicaragua or El Salvador, the 
Honduran military very rarely admits to institutional 
weaknesses or failings, regardless of how ample the record 
in contrast stands. 
 
“Lost” Military Weapons, the “Narco-Storehouse” and 
Opportunities Following from the Coup  
There have been a variety of cases of Honduran military 
arms turning up in the hands of Mexican and Colombian 
criminal groups, as well as reports that major drug traffickers 
and their associates operate in Honduran territory, yet 
civilian and military officials rarely address the veracity of 
such charges and typically have denied them by assertion.  
However, under increased pressure – as a variety of reports 
have appeared from U.S. and Guatemalan officials, 
independent academic analysts, and Honduran civil society 
organizations like CONADEH reporting on the rapid 
advances of criminal groups inside the country – the 
government of Porfirio Lobo has recently begun to change 
its tone.
52
   
 
Defense Minister Marlon Pasqua has stated that the 
onslaught by foreign cartels has turned the country into a 
“narco-storehouse,” as major cartels, particularly the Sinaloa 
Cartel and the Zetas, target Honduras for its strategic 
location.
53
  The minister also admitted that currently a 
whopping 80 percent of the cocaine reaching the United 
States from South America has passed through Honduras.  
There has also been in 2011 a rash of new appointments in 
                                                                                                    
bureaucracies to its perspectives and reduce the chances that hard 
questions will be asked. 
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the security sector following revelations of high-level 
civilian collusion with cartels.  This may be a mixed 
blessing, though, as the most prominent official to leave was 
Security Minister Oscar Álvarez, who had been outspoken in 
correctly criticizing the police for pervasive corruption; his 
repeated attempts to purge the police hierarchy (resisted by 
the police establishment) appear to have forced the 
resignation.
54
   
 
A positive sign in these developments is that overwhelming 
evidence and significant pressure from the United States 
apparently can bring Honduran officials to acknowledge 
failings publicly and perhaps begin to address them.  Yet the 
problems now admitted have been brewing for years.  
Already during the Zelaya government the military was 
drawn away from security roles toward development 
assistance, leaving important gaps in the country‟s anti-crime 
policies.  As a result, in 2008 U.S. officials in Honduras 
expressed concerns about the “possible unauthorized 
diversion, misuse, or failure to secure” light weapons (anti-
tank guns, grenades) supplied through U.S. military 
assistance programs to the Honduran forces; such arms have 
been found in Guatemalan criminal stocks, particularly in the 
last year, according to reports by that country‟s new and 
effective attorney general.
55
  Still, by far it was the post-coup 
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period that allowed cartels to breach any barriers that still 
existed to their resource base, transit access, and refuge 
places in Honduras.
56
   
 
Corruption has been common among Honduran political 
elites at all levels, and corrupt links to private business 
interests that support the country‟s traditional leaders are 
well known and widespread.  However, the coup enabled 
political and business elites to raid the spoils of the state 
even more intensively than usual, according to persuasive 
accounts by Honduran analysts; this was also confirmed in 
wiki-leaked U.S. Embassy cables, in one of which 
Ambassador Hugo Llorens described how “Micheletti and 
his colleagues…appear to have cut a significant number of 
back-room deals, which were egregious even by local 
standards.”57   
 
At the same time, at the local level corruption is no less 
apparent.  In the western part of the country, bordering 
Guatemala and El Salvador, are several provinces in which 
Mexican cartels (to date mainly Sinaloa) have bought land 
and estates, boosting their operations there as they launder 
drug profits into “legitimate” holdings.  Alexander Ardón, 
the mayor of El Paraíso in Copán province, is known for his 
small mountain town‟s unusual level of riches, the city-wide 
curfew that allows him to maintain control over his 
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“kingdom” and his police-reported ties to the Sinaloa 
Cartel.
58
  While El Paraíso‟s mayor may be the most 
notorious, he is not alone in establishing protection alliances 
with DTOs.  There is also substantial evidence that Sinaloa‟s 
notorious boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán not only hid out 
but established a veritable operations center in the Santa 
Bárbara province that neighbors Copán.  From there he 
allegedly contracted the December 2009 assassination of 
retired General Julián Arístides González, who as head of 
Honduras‟s counter-drug agency was putting pressure on the 
cartel.
59
    
 
Local landowners in the eastern provinces also have 
established ties to DTOs.  It is a well known secret than 
many of the new landowners in Honduras are drug 
traffickers, which is logical as landownership provides a 
legitimate cover for laundering cash profits, capturing 
operational space, and establishing a cover of local 
legitimacy.  There is also evidence that some landowners 
have contracted private security by former paramilitaries 
from Colombia, and therefore it is worth recalling that 
Colombia‟s paramilitary successor groups are recognized as 
having moved into drug trafficking since their supposed 
demobilization in 2005.  Following the coup in Honduras, 
landowners scaled up their hiring of private security, 
ostensibly to protect against peasant land seizures in the 
tense political climate.  The alleged hiring of former 
Colombian AUC paramilitaries by Miguel Facussé to protect 
his extensive African palm plantations in the eastern Bajo 
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Aguán region drew particular attention from human rights 
groups.
60
  Facussé is one of Honduras‟s richest and 
politically most influential businessmen, whom a wiki-
leaked 2004 U.S. Embassy cable discusses with concern 
following several suspicious drug shipment drops on his 
heavily guarded property.
61
   
 
All this connects back to the question of the effectiveness of 
government policies against criminal groups.  Landowner 
“insecurity” and land rights activism have recently been used 
to make the government‟s case for an expanded military 
presence in the northeast and for an overnight no-fly zone 
that would extend across one-third of Honduras.  Most acute 
is the conflict in Bajo Aguán in the coastal province of 
Colón, where deadly land disputes led in August 2011 to the 
deployment of hundreds of army troops to “pacify” the 
region.  Security Minister Oscar Álvarez asserted (without 
providing any supportive evidence) that the protesters are in 
fact drug traffickers seeking control of land, enabling the 
military-backed police action that brought 1,000 military 
troops and police into the area – and setting the stage for the 
government to request the necessary congressional 
approval.
62
 
 
On the surface, a no-fly zone makes logical sense, given that 
most drug shipments transiting from South America arrive in 
Honduras by aircraft at night.  However, among experts 
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consulted for this project, several expressed concern that the 
entire situation is a foil, in which governing elites are 
complicit, to allow greater free movement for drug 
trafficking.
63
  That assessment may seem to stretch beyond 
rational belief, but given the extensive scale of corruption 
throughout the Honduran state, it would be irrational to 
simply rule this possibility out. 
 
A significant question is whether the planned no-fly zone 
would be effective and enforceable.  On the one hand, there 
simply are no serious anti-corruption efforts enforced by the 
state.
64
  In the absence of enhanced state capacity to counter 
corruption and crime, a no-fly strategy will at best have to be 
perpetuated indefinitely to reduce the trafficking scourge.  
On the other hand, it is possible to see the crisis of the 
Honduran state, and its dependence on constructive foreign 
assistance, as an opportunity to strengthen some institutions.  
 
Within that portrait, the Honduran military is still 
significantly less corrupted by criminal groups than the 
police and other civilian public officials.  As is generally true 
elsewhere in the region, within the military the navy and air 
force stand out as the least “exposed” and as the least 
corrupted.  The navy wins praise especially from U.S. 
officials for being the lone effective deterrent and 
interdiction force through its base in the remote far eastern 
region of Mosquitia, a rainforested area extending to the 
border with Nicaragua.  The air force, in turn, in July of 2011 
signed a promising cooperation agreement with the 
Colombian air force, through which they agree to share their 
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air traffic intelligence and are able to fly into each other‟s 
airspace to pursue undocumented flights.  The agreement 
allows Honduras to benefit from Colombia‟s more 
formidable experience and technology and may well have an 
important external monitoring effect as each side works to 
live up to the expectations of joint work under the 
agreement.
65
   
 
All of the components discussed above – the military‟s 
continued institutional autonomy, the state‟s weak 
institutions, the setbacks in counterdrug work resulting from 
the coup, and a political environment in which political elites 
very apparently cooperate with DTOs – make it extremely 
difficult for the military to remain free of ties to illegal 
groups.  While there is no apparent evidence that officers are 
systematically engaged with illegal traffickers, as one local 
U.S. official noted in an interview, “the security policy to 
date has not been effective enough to warrant attempts to co-
opt the military.”66  If military interdictions become more 
effective, for instance through the planned no-fly zone or 
cooperation with the Colombian military, then the Honduran 
military will likely face greater co-optation efforts by DTOs 
that need to be anticipated with institutional reforms 
undertaken now.    
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The foregoing survey of the three cases shows the strong 
need to pursue a comprehensive range of reforms that are not 
targeted exclusively to the military.  With regard to the 
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military, though, it is crucial “open” military forces that are 
hermetically sealed from civilian oversight; this is necessary 
especially in Honduras, but also in Nicaragua where “self-
restraint” is a poor substitute for congressional oversight of 
military holdings and practices.  The policy 
recommendations offered in the next sections fall into three 
categories – military, wider domestic, and international. 
 
1) Military  
Give military social safety net incentives to stay clean.  
Like everyone else, the military needs a reassuringly stable, 
well-run social security/medical benefit program.  In 
Nicaragua, there are enough incentives to keep the vast 
majority in the military away from collusion with illegal 
trafficking groups:  through the social security fund, but also 
by enabling a future career trajectory that is not limited only 
to the private security mold.  However, it is crucial that 
military welfare be transparently managed to enhance 
efficiency– there are no national security concerns at stake, 
and both military payees and the public at large that partially 
funds the program should have oversight. 
 
Require (and provide access to) higher education for 
military officers to allow them to better integrate into 
society after they have left military service. In the majority 
of countries in the region, the only or best second career 
should not be in private security.  Again, this is something 
Nicaragua has done well and others have not. For instance, 
El Salvador was the place where the retired military officers 
interviewed for this project (all of whom had reached at least 
the rank of coronel and in one case the highest rank in his 
service) spoke of frustration in being unable to maintain their 
previous standard of living on a fixed pension, and with no 
effective structures provided by the military institution to 
smooth the transition.   
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Last but not least, in this category also falls the 
recommendation to better inventory and secure military 
arsenals.  Now more than ever before, military stockpiles 
have become the targets of DTOs seeking military-grade 
arms.  Efforts to secure arsenals appear to have paid off in El 
Salvador, though they were applied quite late in response to 
already-high levels of theft.  Countries should not leave this 
crucial temptation open until the late in the game. 
 
Create new vetted military units, phase out old ones.  
Starting fresh is not a bad idea, as a USIP report on El 
Salvador‟s post-conflict reforms emphasized: 
The creation of a new security force usually 
seems the most expensive option, and slow 
and inefficient in comparison with the 
option of reorganizing or restructuring 
current forces. This may be so in the short 
term, but in the long term it is economically 
more viable and faster, because when a 
force is unsound and out of control as a 
result of years of abuse of power and 
corruption, there is little that re-
engineering can be expected to do.
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Creating new units is a major investment in time and effort, 
but one likely to pay back handsomely.  For instance, Amaya 
Cóbar has found that such units benefit from significant 
political support and greater resource allocation, which 
makes them measurably more effective at what they do.
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Guatemala is now beginning this very kind of process, under 
the Police Reform Commission directed by the country‟s 
leading human rights activist, Helen Mack (vetting top police 
ranks, hiring new forces, and limiting promotion to those 
with successful records).  However, a similar cleansing has 
not taken place in the armed forces.  In that case, it is valid to 
ask what would be more destabilizing to state and citizen 
security:  a strategic purge with prosecution of the military 
and security forces and promotion of only thoroughly vetted 
officers, or the continued “stability” of partially 
compromised forces? 
 
Monitor professions that former military, particularly 
Special Forces, go into after leaving service.  There is a 
need to better monitor the paths that members of highly 
trained units take after leaving the service.  Reporting to civil 
authorities should be mandatory and the highest penalties 
should be raise for associations with criminal groups.   
 
All told, procedures like these will not stop all illicit 
behavior, but they can strongly de-incentivize it.  Even 
frustrated officers, like those in El Salvador of today, 
overwhelmingly want to be identified with the integrity the 
institution has evolved toward in the wake of the reforms 
required under the peace accords.  For instance, Carlos 
Guillermo Ramos, the sociologist who directs FLACSO‟s 
program in El Salvador, noted that Salvadoran officers are 
typically proud of the fact that they are not tainted by illicit 
ties like their peers in other countries. 
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2) Wider Circuit of Reform 
Scale up the circuit of reforms to address weaknesses in 
national judicial systems and police forces.  The “military 
problem” is impossible to address without looking at these 
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related issues.  In particular, except for clearly defined and 
civilian-monitored missions in extreme circumstances, the 
military should not be pulled into wholesale counter-drug 
work – yet this bucks the current trend across Central 
America.  While military interdiction of air and sea 
trafficking is indispensible, these activities do not expose 
military forces as directly to the general public (which gives 
criminal groups easier access to military forces) and 
especially to criminal elements and corrupt local officials 
who can develop informal working relationships with 
military units. It is crucially necessary to get the military off 
the streets and out of local communities to reduce the 
possibility for corruption in its ranks.   Police should remain 
the primary force deployed for anti-crime work, and where 
regular police are overextended by the challenge, special 
police units – anti-crime, anti-corruption – are essential.  
However, this is only possible with serious reforms of 
judicial systems and law enforcement – including enhanced 
legal powers for prosecutors who typically achieve only 2-3 
percent of conviction rates, and significant pay increase for 
police to reduce the low level corruption that allows criminal 
groups to thrive.
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3) International Cooperation 
Build cooperative military ties among countries in the 
region.  Given historical animosities, rivalries, and the sticky 
ideal of sovereignty, militaries in the region are particularly 
hard to win over to mutual cooperation.  Focusing resource 
on those services in the military that are most receptive to 
regional cooperation should be a priority.  In particular, 
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attention should go toward encouraging regional military 
cooperation to conduct combined operations, to share 
relevant intelligence, and also to monitor each other‟s 
integrity and operational effectiveness.  
 
Cooperation between like services.  With this in mind, new 
efforts at cooperation between specific services of Central 
American militaries and their peers in other countries may be 
promising.  A case in point is the agreement between the 
Colombian and Honduran air forces, as noted earlier.  
Obviously, there is a substantial disparity between the 
greater resources of Colombia‟s military and those of Central 
American militaries, which is precisely why an agreement, 
like the one between Colombia and Honduras, is useful.  
Through it, Colombia can fly into Honduran air space if in 
pursuit of a suspected drug flight, and the Honduran air force 
can make use of Colombian radar and intelligence 
platforms.
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Shore up and deepen ties with the most effective, 
trustworthy actors.   In most countries, the Navy appears to 
be extremely effective because it is less “exposed” to 
criminal association through policing roles.  It also seems to 
be the least crime-corrupted of all the services.  Navies in 
Central America are making sometimes-spectacular “hits” 
against illegal groups.  How this plays out in Mexico may be 
telling.  There, the Zetas have targeted navy personnel for 
display kidnappings and killings (most recently in August 
2011) and the following month the navy broke up the Zetas‟ 
sophisticated communications structure in Veracruz.  The 
implication is that military forces best placed and disciplined 
to “stay clean” in the fight against criminal groups are likely 
                                                 
71 “Fuerzas Aéreas de Colombia y Honduras firman acuerdo de 
cooperación,” Noticias del Aire, Aviacol.net, July 16, 2011. 
http://www.aviacol.net/noticias-del-aire/avances/fuerzas-aereas-de-
colombia-y-honduras-firman-acuerdo-de-cooperacion.html  
38 
 
to be specifically targeted for intimidation or cooptation by 
those groups.  National governments, as well as the U.S. 
should anticipate this outcome in coordinating their military 
assistance agreements in the region.  Scrupulously vetting 
and protecting these forces will yield added value in what are 
already-costly regional security efforts to halt illegal groups. 
 
Finally, pay closer attention to civil society organizations 
and policy-oriented research centers.  These exist 
throughout the region and have played an important role in 
monitoring government policies and security forces‟ 
activities in their countries.  Indeed, in the toughest case in 
the region, Guatemala, it is two prominent civil society 
activists – noted human rights leader Helen Mack and legal 
scholar-activist Claudia Paz y Paz – who are instituting the 
country‟s most promising reforms of the police and justice 
system.  As analysts of data-based trends and disseminators 
of information, civil society organizations serve a crucial 
independent oversight role in their countries.  The same is 
true for top-notch investigative journalists in the region who 
have probed deeply into otherwise-opaque connections and 
resources of public officials and their associates.  In fact, 
civil society organizations and journalists were an impressive 
and crucial source of the data collected for this study.  
 
The importance of civil society actors in Central America is 
an indispensible sign of the promise that indeed exists in the 
region for building democracy – a promise often 
overshadowed by the frightening reports of criminal violence 
and alarming statistics that have become the region‟s 
trademark identifiers.  The patient may be very ill, but no 
one should be getting ready to call the morgue.  Rather, 
treatments must be applied that are specific to each patient 
and allowed to take their course:  political-institutional 
reforms are always costly and rarely are completed rapidly.  
Central American governments need consistent support to be 
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able to make advances in extremely difficult times.  U.S. 
policy needs to help them stay on course, even if progress is 
slow or there are setbacks. 
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